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Abstract. In standard economic theory, labor supply decisions depend on the complete
set of prices: the wage and the prices of relevant consumption goods. Nonetheless, most
of theoretical and empirical work ignores prices other than wages when studying labor
supply. The question we address in this paper is whether the common practice of ignoring
local price variation in labor supply studies is as innocuous as has generally been assumed.
We describe a simple model to demonstrate that the e®ects of wage and non-labor income
on labor supply will typically di®er by location. We show, in particular, the derivative
of the labor supply with respect to non-labor income will be independent of price only
when labor supply takes a form based on an implausible separability condition. Empirical
evidence demonstrates that the e®ect of price on labor supply is not a simple \up-or-down
shift" that would be required to meet the separability condition in our key proposition.
JEL: J01, J21, R23.
Keywords: labor supply, local labor markets, local prices.
Introduction
In standard economic theory, labor supply decisions depend on the complete set of prices:
the wage and the prices of relevant consumption goods. Nonetheless, as Abbott and Ashen-
felter (1976) noted some thirty years ago, economists have generally found it a useful ab-
straction, in both theoretical and empirical work, to ignore prices other than wages when
studying labor supply. For example, none of the empirical results on labor supply discussed
in the prominent reviews of Pencavel (1986), Killingsworth and Heckman (1986), or Blun-
dell and MaCurdy (1999) are derived using procedures that account for variation in any
price variation other than wages.
1
Most of the empirical work on labor does, however, use national data sets, with individuals
who live in di®erent locations and who therefore face di®erent prices for locally-priced goods.
These price di®erences can be quite large, especially for housing. For example, in the 1990
Census, the median housing price in New York is over three times that of the median housing
Date: May 14, 2008. Black is a±liated with University of Chicago and NORC, Kolesnikova with the
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, and Taylor with Carnegie Mellon University. The views expressed are
those of the authors and do not necessarily re°ect o±cial position of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis,
the Federal Reserve System, or the Board of Governors.
1Abbott and Ashenfelter (1976)'s evaluation of labor supply in the U.S. over the 1929-67 time period
exploits time series changes in relative prices but did not evaluate possible impacts of cross-sectional variation
(which, as they say, is \expected to be small"). There is some work that conducts sensitivity analysis, using
Bureau of Labor Statistics information on the cost of living to \adjust" wages. See, for instance, DaVanzo
et al. (1973) and Masters and Gar¯nkel (1977).
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price in Cleveland.
2 The question we address in this paper is whether the common practice
of ignoring local price variation in labor supply studies is as innocuous as has generally been
assumed.
The ¯rst step we take in examining this issue is to set up a simple theoretical model: an
economy in which people live in di®erent locations that have di®ering levels of a production
or consumption amenity. Following logic familiar in urban economics, e.g., in Roback (1982),
equilibrium prices will di®er across locations. We demonstrate that in such a model, labor
supply behavior can vary across location as well.
Our second step is to then demonstrate that when prices vary across location, one can
indeed safely ignore local variation in prices only when preferences take a very speci¯c and
peculiar form. We also show that the responsiveness of labor supply to wage changes will
be the same across locations only if the responsiveness of labor supply to non-labor income
changes is the same across locations.
The third step in our research is to evaluate the potential empirical importance of our
theoretical observations. We present results that we obtain using 1990 Public Use Micro-
Samples (PUMS) of the 1990 U.S. Census, examining labor supply in the nation's 50 largest
cities. We focus on the labor force participation and hours decisions of white married women
aged 30 to 50|a group whose labor decisions are quite responsive to changes in wage and
non-labor income.
The general idea of our exploration is to look at the basic \building block" empirical
relationship that would underlie any empirical analysis of labor supply for this group: the
relationship between non-labor income and labor supply. Our innovation is to examine these
relationships for each of the 50 cities separately and to demonstrate that there is signi¯cant
systematic variation among them.
We ¯nd that the basic correlation|between labor supply and non-labor income|di®ers
across cities. For example, women who have relatively high non-labor income (primarily
husband's income) work relatively fewer hours and have lower participation rates. Impor-
tantly, from our perspective, this anticipated negative relationship is substantially more
pronounced in cities with inexpensive housing than in cities with expensive housings.
2Gabriel and Rosenthal (2004) and Chen and Rosenthal (2006) show that massive housing price di®erences
pertain across cities even after careful adjustment for quality.LABOR SUPPLY 3
1. A Model of Local Labor Markets With Stone-Geary Preferences
We begin by setting out a simple model of local price variation along the lines of Roback
(1982) and Haurin (1980). Locations di®er along one of two criteria: (i) a location may
be inherently more pleasant, i.e, have a higher level of a \consumption amenity" like nice
weather, or (ii) a location may be associated with inherently higher productivity, owing, for
example, to the presence of a natural resource or to agglomeration economies in production.
For simplicity of presentation we restrict attention to cases in which people choose to live
in one of two cities.
In contrast to the standard urban location models such as Roback (1982) or Haurin
(1980), which ¯x labor supply to be a constant, we allow labor supply to be a choice
variable. Preferences are assumed to be Stone-Geary. This is a particularly transparent
form of utility, and, as Ashenfelter and Ham (1979) note, is the simplest functional form of
utility used in applied empirical work examining labor supply.
3 We assume, in particular,
that individual i has utility ui as a function of a consumption good x, leisure l (which is
scaled so that 0 · l · 1), and an amenity level Aj (that is speci¯c to location j), according
to a simple Stone-Geary form:
(1) ui = µijAj(x ¡ c)±l1¡±;
where c and ± are parameters that are common across individuals and µij is a positive
idiosyncratic parameter that equals 1 for a typical individual, but allows for the possibility
that person i has a particular attraction, or distaste, for location j (as µij is greater than,
or less than, 1).
A person living in location j maximizes utility subject to a budget constraint, pjx =
wj(1 ¡ l) + N, where pj is the price for the local consumption good, wj is the local wage,
and N is non-labor income. Assuming an interior solution pertains, demand for leisure and
for the consumption good are, respectively,
(2) l(wj;pj) =





±(N + wj ¡ cpj)
pj
+ c:
3See also Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) for a discussion of the Stone-Geary form, as well as other forms
used in applied work on labor supply.4 DAN BLACK, NATALIA KOLESNIKOVA, AND LOWELL TAYLOR
Substituting (2) and (3) into (1) gives indirect utility for person i in location j:
(4) V ij =





In equilibrium each individual chooses to live in the location that yields the highest level
of utility. There are two locations, j = 1 or 2. We work through two cases: ¯rst, with
di®ering consumption amenities, and second, with di®ering levels of productivity in the
locations.
Case 1. Di®ering Levels of the Consumption Amenity. Suppose there is general agree-
ment that location 1 is nicer than location 2, A1 > A2, and for the moment assume further
that there are no idiosyncratic di®erences in opinion about location, so that µij = 1 for all
individuals. Since workers are equally productive in the two locations, wages w1 and w2
must be the same, say w.4 In an equilibrium in which people live in both locations, we must
have V i1 = V i2, so using (4), it is clear that p1 and p2 must solve
(5)
A1(N + w ¡ cp1)
p±
1w1¡± =
A2(N + w ¡ cp2)
p±
2w1¡± :
Inspection of (5) con¯rms the intuitive result that p1 > p2; the local consumption good is
more expensive in the high-amenity city.
This logic continues to hold if we add back the idiosyncratic taste component to utility.
If for the marginal individual µi1 = µi2 = 1, equation (5) still characterizes equilibrium
prices. In this instance, however, some individuals will have a strict preference with regard
to location. For example, an individual with µi1 > µi2 will have a strict preference for
location 1 over location 2.
We turn next to labor supply. Let h be the fraction of time that a person works, h = 1¡l.
From (2), we have
(6) h(w;pj) =
±w ¡ (1 ¡ ±)(N ¡ cpj)
w
:
Although wages are the same in the two locations, labor supply di®ers. In this example
h(w;p1) > h(w;p2); individuals supply more labor when they work in the more expensive
city.
4For simplicity, we are implicitly assuming that labor is the only factor of production, so that ¯rms will
be indi®erent in hiring if the wage is the same in the two cities. This would not be true, for example, if land
were a major factor of production, and had di®ering prices in the two cities.LABOR SUPPLY 5
Suppose instead we focus on the e®ect of a wage change in a local labor market (examining





(1 ¡ ±)(N ¡ cpj)
w2 :
Notice that in this example, the responsiveness of labor supply to a wage change is greater



















Case 2. Di®ering Levels of Productivity. Now suppose that locations 1 and 2 are viewed
as equally pleasant, A1 = A2, but productivity is higher in location 1 than in location 2, so
that w1 > w2. The equilibrium condition corresponding to (5), that the marginal individual
is indi®erent between locations (i.e., V i1 = V i2); is then
(9)










As for labor supply, in city j,
(10) h(wj;pj) =
±wj ¡ (1 ¡ ±)(N ¡ cpj)
wj
:
In general labor supply di®ers in the two locations, but even with p1 > p2 and w1 >






; and we cannot say in which city labor supply is more responsive
to wage changes. On the other hand, in this example the derivative of labor supply with








turns out to be independent of pj. In this example the derivative of labor supply with respect
to non-labor income does not depend on the local price p; but because in equilibrium the
high-productivity city has relatively higher wages, we expect to observe that @h=@N will
be smaller (in absolute value) in the expensive city.
Our examples illustrate two important points. First, cross-sectional variation in wages
prices may be associated with variation in labor supply, though that cross-sectional variation
5In general, if the wage increases in a labor market, this can attract new individuals to that location.
Here we are interested in the e®ect on the labor supply of individuals who are already in the market, for
example people who have an idiosyncratic taste for that location.6 DAN BLACK, NATALIA KOLESNIKOVA, AND LOWELL TAYLOR
is of no value for understanding the behavioral e®ect of wage changes on labor supply. For
instance, in our Case 2, even if in both cities
@h(wj;pj)
@w
> 0; identical individuals may well
supply less labor in the high-wage city than in the low-city. Second, the responsiveness of
labor supply to changes in the wage or non-labor income will typically vary across location.
2. When Does Price Variation Matter for Local Labor Supply?
As we noted in the introduction, there is massive price variation in housing prices across
U.S. cities, presumably owing to di®erences in consumption or production amenities across
these locations. The examples given in the last section indicate that labor supply will
vary across locations even in the unusually simple and transparent case of Stone-Geary
preferences. We next turn to a more systematic investigation of conditions on preferences
under which price and income e®ects on labor supply do not depend on location. As is
common in the literature, we restrict attention to the case of quasi-homothetic preferences
(of which Stone-Geary is a special case). Having accepted this common simpli¯cation, we
ask what further restriction are necessary to allow investigators to ignore variation across
locations when examining labor supply.6
Given quasi-homothetic preferences, indirect utility takes the form
(12) V (p;w;N) = ®(p;w) + (N + w)¯(p;w);
where, as before, p is a local price, w is a local wage, and N is a non-labor income. Using
Roy's identity we derive the demand for leisure,








®w(p;w) + (N + w)¯w(p;w)
¯(p;w)
¡ 1;
(13) l(p;w;N) = ¡
®w(p;w) + (N + w)¯w(p;w)
¯(p;w)
:
Then hours of labor supply are
(14)
h(p;w;N) = 1¡l(p;w;N) = 1+
®w(p;w) + (N + w)¯w(p;w)
¯(p;w)
:= a(p;w)+(N +w)b(p;w);







6We could attempt to analyze cases that are more general yet, but as we shall see matters are su±ciently
discouraging even for the quasi-homothetic case.LABOR SUPPLY 7









is independent of p (and thus is the same across locations) if and




= b(w) () ¯(p;w) = ¯1(p)¯2(w).













where ¯1(p) = ec(p), ¯2(w) = e
R
b(w)dw. ¤
The above observations can be summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 1. When preferences are quasi-homothetic,
@h
@N
is independent of location if
and only if preferences satisfy a separability condition ¯(p;w) = ¯1(p)¯2(w).








not depend on local prices p. If b(p;w) = b(w), as above, then the only other necessary
condition is to have aw(p;w) independent of p. Now aw(p;w) is independent of p if and
only if it is equal to some function of w only: aw(p;w) = f(w). Integrating both parts with
respect to w, we get a(p;w) = F(w) + c(p). Then the supply of hours of work takes an
additively-separable form h(p;w;N) = c(p) + F(w) + (N + w)b(w).
We have established, therefore,







location if and only if the demand for leisure has additively-separable form
(15) h(p;w;N) = c(p) + F(w) + (N + w)b(w):
Notice that in (15) the e®ect of local price variation is to simply shift the labor supply
function up or down. In this case, it might su±ce to merely incorporate location-speci¯c
dummies when estimating labor supply functions.7 Absent this separability, though, local
7In fact, in empirical work on labor supply, researchers generally do not even take this simple step.8 DAN BLACK, NATALIA KOLESNIKOVA, AND LOWELL TAYLOR
price variation would have a fundamental impact on the shape of the labor supply function
itself.
These two propositions demonstrate that even in the simple case of quasi-homothetic
preferences, one needs rather strong conditions in order to have location-independent labor
supply responses to income and wage changes.
The Stone-Geary example used in the previous section illustrates the point. Notice that
indirect utility can be written in the form V = ®(p;w) + (N + w)¯(p;w), where
®(p;w) = ¡
cpµA±±(1 ¡ ±)1¡±










Since ¯(p;w) is separable in p and w, the separability condition of Proposition 1 is
satis¯ed. Recall from (6) that h(p;w;N) =
±w ¡ (1 ¡ ±)(N ¡ cp)
w
. Obviously, this function
does not have an additively-separable form from Proposition 2. So we are not surprised











(1 ¡ ±)(N ¡ cp)
w2 ; depends on p.
The primary object of study in labor supply is the responsiveness of labor supply to
changes in the wage. We would like to know if observed price variation is important to
understanding this issue. Ideally we would like to observe an experiment in which wages
are exogenously shifted in each of many di®erent U.S. cities and then trace out changes in
labor supplied in each city. Finding data that correspond to such an experiment is a tall
order. The work that follows instead focuses exclusively on the sensitivity of labor supply
to non-labor income. We can justify this focus with the following result:
Proposition 3. In general labor supply h(p;w;F) depends on the price of the local good,
the wage, and full income F = w+N.8 If the key relationship
@h
@w
is independent of p; then
@h
@N
is independent of p.













. This is independent of price





8Recall that fulltime work entails h = 1, so that the maximum possible labor income is w, making full
income w + N.LABOR SUPPLY 9
Integrating both sides of (18) we then notice that labor supply must have following additively
separable form:
(19) h(p;w;F) = g(w;F) + c(p;w) = g(w;w + N) + c(p;w):






or, integrating both sides,
(21) h(p;w;F) = q(w;F) + k(p) = q(w;w + N) + k(p):
Compare the additive separability requirements (19) and (21). The latter takes the same
basic form, but is more restrictive. It follows that when
@h
@w
is independent of local price p;
@h
@N
is independent of the local price p.
3. Empirical Results
Theoretical considerations outlined in the preceding section suggest that unless one is
willing to place strong restrictions on preferences, labor supply responsiveness to non-labor
income and to the wage will vary across locations. It is possible, of course, that in reality
the di®erences are insigni¯cant and do not pose a problem for empirical work. We examine
this possibility using a data set of married white women|a group that is likely to have
substantial variation in labor supply (e.g., in response to di®erences in wage, non-labor
income, and possibly local prices). Data used in the analysis are from 1990 Public Use
Micro Sample (PUMS);9 data include married non-Hispanic white women, aged 30 to 50,
who live in the 50 largest Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) in the United States.
The goal of this exploration is to see if there are systematic di®erences in labor supply
related to di®erences in local prices. We look at the relationship between labor supply and
non-labor income, using as our de¯nition family income minus the woman's own income.
Given previous research on married women's labor supply, one would generally expect to
¯nd an inverse relationship between non-labor income and labor supply, i.e., leisure is likely
a \normal good." The question examined here is whether that relationship di®ers in a
systematic way across cities.
9Data were provided by Minnesota Population Center, Ruggles et al. (2004).10 DAN BLACK, NATALIA KOLESNIKOVA, AND LOWELL TAYLOR
We understand that examining the relationship between non-labor income and married
women's labor labor supply in cross-section is far from the \state of the art" in estimating
labor supply. Still, it seems to us to be a reasonable ¯rst pass at the issue, especially given
that our focus is not so much on any estimated relationship per se, but on di®erences in the
relationships in expensive and inexpensive urban areas.
In our investigation of the di®erences in the response of labor supply to the change in
non-labor income, we do not want to specify any parametric form because of concerns
that results might be sensitive to the functional form.10 Instead we use a non-parametric
matching estimator. Two measures of labor supply are used: annual hours of work and
an employment participation dummy variable.11 The data do not allow us to perform this
analysis for each city because it does not provide enough support. Instead we divide the
sample roughly into thirds and examine di®erences between the most \expensive" cities (the
17 MSAs within top one third of housing prices) and \inexpensive" cities (the 17 MSAs
with the lowest housing prices).
Our comparison of married women's labor supply in inexpensive and expensive cities then
follows three additional steps. The ¯rst step is to place households into deciles according
to \non-labor income" (which is predominately the husband's income). Then within each
decile we compare the labor supply of women who live in the expensive cities relative to
the labor supply of women who live in inexpensive cities. The goal is to compare the labor
supply of otherwise similar women, so we use an estimator the matches women with exactly
the same age and level of education. Separate analyses are also conducted for women
with high school education and college education. Thus, the second step is to match each
woman living in an expensive city with the corresponding women living in inexpensive cities,
i.e., match each woman in each non-labor income decile di (i = 1;:::;10), with age and
education vector x = X, to women with these same characteristics living in inexpensive
cities. In the analysis that centers on annual work hours this is
(22) ¢(X;di) = E(h1jx = X;di) ¡ E(h0jx = X;di);
where h1, h0 are annual hours of work in expensive and inexpensive city respectively. In the
absence of selection, this might be taken to be the causal e®ect on labor supply (measured
in hours per year) of living in an expensive city relative to an inexpensive city. The third
10See, for example, DaVanzo et al. (1973).
11We also repeated the analysis with several other measures of labor force participation such as indicator
of full-time position, for instance. The results remain essentially the same.LABOR SUPPLY 11




where dFn(xjdi) is the national distribution of x in the decile di.
Our analysis is repeated using a second measure of labor supply|a labor force participa-
tion dummy variable. When these empirical exercises are carried out separately for women
with high school degree and with college degree, X is simply an age vector.
Results are reported in Table 1. The di®erence in annual hours of work between women
living in expensive and inexpensive cities is substantial (and statistically signi¯cant) for
many of the non-labor income deciles. For example, in ninth decile women in expensive cities
work considerably longer hours than corresponding women in inexpensive cities. College
educated women in this decile work on average 129 hours more, while women with high
school education work on average 89 hours more.
There is an apparent and striking pattern depicted in Table 1 and illustrated in Figure
1. First, we notice, that as we might have expected, among these married women leisure
appears to be a normal good; women with higher levels of outside income generally work
fewer hours per year and have lower participation rates. More importantly, for our purposes,
the relationship between non-labor income and labor supply is quite di®erent for expensive
and inexpensive cities. At the very lowest levels of non-labor income (e.g., deciles 1 and 2),
women living in expensive cities have lower labor supply than women living in inexpensive
cities. For the most part, the opposite is true for women in the high non-labor income
deciles; among women with high non-labor income, labor force participation and average
hours worked are higher in expensive cities than in inexpensive cities.
In short, the labor/leisure choice appears not to conform to the additively separable form
described in Proposition 2; local prices do not merely shift labor supply up or down. We
see that the derivative @h=@N is observed to be generally negative (at least beyond the
lowest decile levels of N), and is be smaller (in absolute value) in the expensive city. This
generalization holds true for both high school and college educated women.
Also, as we have noted, results are similar when we use \average hours" or \labor force
participation rates" as our measure of labor supply. It is worth noting that in these cities
66% of high-school educated women and 70% of college educated women are employed on
average. Thus percentage point di®erences of 5 to 7, between expensive and inexpensive
cities, represent di®erentials of 8 to 10 percent, which seem to us to be quite substantial.12 DAN BLACK, NATALIA KOLESNIKOVA, AND LOWELL TAYLOR
The non-parametric approach we have taken does have one disadvantage: The non-
labor income distribution within each decile might be somewhat di®erent for women in the
expensive cities than in the inexpensive cities. An alternative °exible parametric approach
to estimation, described in the Appendix, provides nearly identical inferences.
Our empirical ¯ndings are roughly consistent with Case 2 examined in Section 1 above. In
that equilibrium example, with Stone-Geary preferences, we notice that the responsiveness
of labor supply to non-labor income must be greater in inexpensive (low-productivity) cities
than expensive (high-productivity) cities.
4. Concluding Remarks
We have described a simple model to demonstrate that the e®ects of wage and non-
labor income on labor supply will typically di®er by location. We show, in particular, the
derivative of the labor supply with respect to non-labor income will be independent of price
only when labor supply takes a form based on an implausible separability condition.
Empirical evidence demonstrates that the e®ect of price on labor supply is not a simple
\up-or-down shift" that would be required to meet the separability condition in our key
proposition. For example, among women with low non-labor income, living in an inexpensive
city is associated with higher labor force participation and longer work hours, while among
women with high non-labor income, living in an inexpensive city is associated with lower
labor force participation and shorter work hours.
This work has a number of implications for empirical strategies in estimating labor supply
and also for other policy research. First, our research makes clear it that empirical work
should never use cross-sectional variation in wages to estimate parameters in labor supply
models. We document big di®erences in quantity of labor supplied across cities (for married
women) that may have little to do with behavioral responses to cross-sectional variation in
the wage.
Second, because labor supply elasticities will vary by location, researchers must be careful
in interpreting results based on instrumental variables (IV) strategies. For example, suppose
an IV approach is used in which the IV is the price of coal. Variation in the price of coal
arguably serve as an excellent source of wage variation in the coal industry, but the resulting
estimates of the e®ect on labor supply would apply only for the regions where the coal
industry is a major employer. If local prices di®er in those regions from other parts of the
country, the estimated relationships will not be generalizable for the country as a whole.LABOR SUPPLY 13
Third, using a back-of-the-envelope example, we show that the evidence we present in
Table 1 is consistent with the possibility that wage elasticities or labor supply (for married
women) are quite di®erent across cities. Notice that the Slutsky equation, in elasticity form,
gives the relationship







where "w is the observed wage elasticity of supply, "H
w is the corresponding Hicksian elasticity
(re°ecting the pure substitution e®ect), and "N is the elasticity of labor supply with respect
to non-labor income. Now consider college-educated married women at the median level
of non-labor income. Notice that if we take as causal the relationship drawn in Figure 1,
going from the 4th to 6th deciles in income we would estimate a non-labor income elasticity
"N = ¡0:46 in the expensive cities and ¡0:29 in the inexpensive cities. Suppose that the
Hicksian elasticity is "H
w = 0:50 (and is the same in both cities). We estimate that for the
average woman at the 4th decile wh=N is 0.57 in inexpensive cities and 0.61 in expensive
cities.12 Thus the the uncompensated labor supply elasticity is more than a third higher in
expensive cities than inexpensive cities, 0.33 vs. 0.24.
Fourth, as an example of an application to policy-related research, we notice that there
may be locational di®erences in the response of female labor supply to changes in taxes.
Changes in income taxes, for instance, would have di®erent e®ects in di®erent cities. A
closely related implication centers on the analysis of social welfare policy. (Recall, for
example, that it is wives of husbands with low earnings who work less in more expensive
cities.) We believe that further analysis of policy implications is warranted.
12In fact, the ratio of women's earnings to non-labor household income (primarily men's earnings) is
larger in expensive cities than in inexpensive cities at every decile.14 DAN BLACK, NATALIA KOLESNIKOVA, AND LOWELL TAYLOR
Appendix
The empirical inferences drawn in Table 1 are based on an entirely non-parametric ap-
proach. We divided our sample into ten non-labor income deciles, and compared labor
supply across women within each of these cells. Our central ¯nding is that for women in
low non-income deciles labor supply is lower in expensive cities than in inexpensive cites,
while for women in high non-income deciles labor supply is higher in expensive cities than
in inexpensive cities.
Here we present a °exible parametric approach that, as it turns out, leads to this same
inference. The idea we implement here is to estimate labor supply regressions using as
independent variables age, entered as 21 dummy variables for each age, 30 to 50 inclusive,
and non-labor income, entered as a fourth-order polynomial. We estimate these labor supply
regressions|separately for high-school women and college women and separately for each
of our labor supply variables (employment and hours worked)|using the sample of women
from the expensive cities. We similarly estimate corresponding regressions using the sample
of women from the inexpensive cities. Then for each woman i who lives in the expensive
cities we estimate the outcome of interest ^ y1i (e.g., \predicted" employment, or \predicted"
hours worked) using the regression parameter from the expensive city, and similarly estimate
^ y0i using regression parameters from the inexpensive city. Finally we form the estimated
gap,
^ ¢i = ^ y1i ¡ ^ y0i
for each individual. Notice that this last quantity is the \impact of the treatment on the
treated" where the \treatment" is being located in an expensive city rather than in an
inexpensive city.
To summarize ¯ndings in a way that will be comparable to Table 1, we aggregate estimates
into deciles of non-labor income. We report 95 percent con¯dence intervals in brackets based
on a bootstrap procedure with 999 replications in Table 3.LABOR SUPPLY 15
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Figure 1. Variation Between Expensive and Inexpensive Locations in An-
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Table 1. Di®erences in Annual Hours and Participation Rates Between
Expensive and Inexpensive Locations by Non-Labor Income Deciles
Women with Women with
All women HS degree college degree
Non-labor ¢ in ¢ in ¢ in ¢ in ¢ in ¢ in
income annual participation annual participation annual participation
decile hours rates hours rates hours rates
d1 -117.34 -0.04 -136.10 -0.04 -78.08 -0.02
(14.23) (0.0065) (24.57) (0.012) (34.88) (0.016)
d2 -75.46 -0.01 -75.72 0.00 -99.43 -0.02
(14.32) (0.0063) (24.36) (0.011) (36.47) (0.016)
d3 -54.14 -0.01 -19.42 0.00 -46.71 -0.01
(13.74) (0.0060) (23.39) (0.012) (33.98) (0.015)
d4 -15.14 0.00 -28.97 -0.01 -20.59 0.00
(13.88) (0.0062) (23.63) (0.012) (37.16) (0.016)
d5 -20.68 0.01 -51.79 0.00 -13.31 0.03
(13.31) (0.0063) (24.14) (0.012) (34.57) (0.015)
d6 2.59 0.02 -39.52 0.00 59.98 0.05
(13.66) (0.0068) (24.14) (0.013) (31.66) (0.015)
d7 12.47 0.01 -16.11 0.00 85.60 0.03
(14.38) (0.0072) (24.79) (0.013) (30.99) (0.015)
d8 83.55 0.05 81.95 0.05 139.38 0.08
(14.62) (0.0076) (26.78) (0.014) (30.24) (0.015)
d9 83.61 0.04 88.98 0.03 128.59 0.06
(15.80) (0.0083) (33.44) (0.017) (30.84) (0.016)
d10 82.59 0.04 15.74 0.00 172.35 0.07
(18.45) (0.0098) (41.52) (0.023) (28.04) (0.015)
Notes: Authors' calculations, Five-Percent 1990 PUMS. Sample consists of white, non-Hispanic married
women, aged 30 to 50. Bootstrapped standard errors using 999 replications reported in parentheses.18 DAN BLACK, NATALIA KOLESNIKOVA, AND LOWELL TAYLOR
Table 2. Di®erences in Annual Hours and Participation Rates Between
Expensive and Inexpensive Locations by Non-Labor Income Deciles, Para-
metric Approach
Women with Women with
HS degree college degree
Non-labor ¢ in ¢ in ¢ in ¢ in
income annual participation annual participation
decile hours rates hours rates
d1 -128.7 -0.034 -118.1 -0.027
(22.04) (0.0110) (34.23) (0.0143)
d2 -93.4 -0.021 -72.5 -0.016
(12.42) (0.0066) (17.76) (0.0079)
d3 -68.6 -0.013 -36.6 -0.002
(11.10) (0.0059) (16.07) (0.0074)
d4 -47.1 -0.005 -9.5 0.009
(10.82) (0.0056) (15.23) (0.0071)
d5 -28.1 0.001 19.1 0.021
(10.26) (0.0056) (14.59) (0.0066)
d6 -2.1 0.01 46.5 0.032
(11.15) (0.0056) (14.18) (0.0066)
d7 23.8 0.019 76.5 0.045
(12.73) (0.0061) (14.59) (0.0071)
d8 55.3 0.030 108.6 0.058
(15.28) (0.0077) (17.27) (0.0082)
d9 87.5 0.042 143.5 0.075
(20.48) (0.0102) (20.89) (0.0099)
d10 81.6 0.036 123.1 0.066
(38.06) (0.0207) (30.26) (0.0151)
Notes: Authors' calculations, 1990 PUMS. Sample is all married, white, non-Hispanic women between the
ages of 30 and 50 inclusive. The covariates are nonlabor income and age. Using fourth-order polynomial,
we use the sample of women from expensive cities to estimate the outcome of interest, which we denote
^ y1i for the ith women. Using the sample of women from inexpensive cities, we estimate parameters for a
fourth-order polynomial and then evaluate the function using the covariates of women from the expensive
city sample, which we denote ^ y0i for the ith women. We then form the parameter for the \impact of
treatment on the treated" as ^ ¢i = ^ y1i¡^ y0i. We then aggregate estimates into deciles of nonlabor income.
We report standard errors based on bootstrap with 999 replications.